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INSURANCE
I. PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS UNDER THE
AUTOMOBILE REPARATION REFORM ACT OF 1974: Tillotson AND THE
1978 AMENDMENTS
In 1977, the South Carolina Supreme Court was asked to
construe the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits provisions'
of the 1974 Automobile Reparation Reform Act.2 In Tillotson v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3 the parties sought
interpretation of the ambiguous language of the Act's subrogation
and offset provisions.4 The legislature has amended the statute
since Tillotson was decided;5 because they will affect future cases
that are similar to Tillotson the case will be discussed in light of
the amendments.
Before the 1978 amendments the Act provided that no auto-
mobile insurance policy was to be issued or renewed in South
Carolina unless it contained the minimum required PIP cover-
age.' The 1978 amendments made these PIP benefits no longer
mandatory. The insurer must make them available to the insured
who may purchase them at his option.7 PIP benefits are generally
paid to the injured person by his own insurer. The Act, however,
provides three exceptions to this rule: if the injured party is a
pedestrian, permissive user, or passenger, he recovers not from his
own insurer, but from the insurer of the owner of the vehicle that
struck him or in which he was riding."
PIP benefits are payable without regard to fault and include
medical, hospital, and disability payments9 of up to $1000 per
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-11-110 to -170 (1976).
2. South Carolina Automobile Reparation Reform Act of 1974, No. 1177, 1974 S.C.
Acts 2718 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-11-10 to -800 (1976)) (amended 1978).
For an excellent discussion of the major provisions of this Act, see Note, The South
Carolina Insurance Reform Act (Part I): "No Fault" and Contributory Negligence-A
Synopsis and Appraisal, 26 S.C.L. REv. 705 (1975).
3. 268 S.C. 248, 233 S.E.2d 295 (1977).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-11-110, -130 (1976) (amended 1978).
5. No. 569, 1978 S.C. Acts 1668.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (1976) (amended 1978).
7. No. 569, 1978 S.C. Acts 1668.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-150(b) (1976).
9. In 1978, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that PIP "disability" benefits
were to be paid while the insured person is living and recuperating. When the insured died
almost instantly, he incurred no loss while living and was not "disabled" under the
meaning of the Act. "It is not the function of PIP no fault insurance coverage to provide
funds for the creation or enhancement of one's estate." Hamrick v. State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., 270 S.C. 176, 180, 241 S.E.2d 548, 549-50 (1978).
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person to cover
all reasonable expenses arising from the accident and sustained
within three years from the date thereof for necessary medical,
surgical, chiropractic, X-ray and dental services, including
prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, profes-
sional nursing and funeral services; and in the case of an income
producer who exercises the option to receive such benefit, pay-
ment of benefits for loss of income as the result of the accident;
and where the person injured in the accident was not an income
or wage producer . . . payments . . . must be made in reim-
bursement of. . . expenses incurred for essential services ordi-
narily performed by the injured person for care and mainte-
nance of the family. . . .,
Two types of PIP coverage are available under the Act. Section
56-11-110 provides that minimum PIP benefits, called Basic Eco-
nomic Loss (BEL) benefits," must be offered to the insured in the
amount of $1000.12 Section 56-11-120 requires insurers to offer
additional PIP coverage, called Supplemental Economic Loss
(SEL) benefits,1 3 in increments ranging up to a $5000 maximum.'4
Before the 1978 amendments, only the SEL benefits were op-
tional; BEL benefits are now accorded the same treatment.'
Tillotson' involved an interpretation of the confusing lan-
guage of the Act's subrogation provisions:' 7 specifically, do these
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (1976) (amended 1978). The 1978 amendments to the
Act provide that the insured must be provided with three options. He may choose (1)
medical, hospital, disability, loss of income benefits, and essential service expense; or (2)
medical, hospital, disability benefits, excluding loss of income benefits and essential
service expense; or (3) no coverage at all. No. 569, 1978 S.C. Acts 1668. See S.C. DEP'T OF
INS., BULL No. 6-78 at 2, (Aug. 16, 1978). In Hamrick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
270 S.C. 176, 241 S.E.2d 548 (1978), the supreme court, interpreting the meaning of
"disability" as used in § 56-11-110, dictated that the "plain and generally accepted mean-
ing" of the word is "the inability of a living person to work." Id. at 180, 181, 241 S.E.2d
at 550. Conceivably, an individual could opt for the lower premium coverage that excludes
"loss of income benefits" and, in a later suit, argue that "disability" under South Carolina
case law includes "loss of income." This would effectuate full recovery even though the
lower premium protection had been chosen. This argument, however, would have a mini-
mal chance of success.
11. Memorandum from Members of Insurance Subcomittee, to Members of Labor,
Commerce and Industry Committee, S.C. House of Representatives (December 14, 1977).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (1976) (amended 1978).
13. Interview with R. Kelsey Foster, Jr., Director of the Auto Rating Section, State
Rating and Statistices Division, S.C. Dept. of Insurance, in Columbia, S.C. (April 13,
1978).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-120 (1976).
15. No. 569, 1978 S.C. Acts 1668.
16. 268 S.C. 248, 233 S.E.2d 295 (1977).
17. Respondent, in his brief, referred to the "difficulty and ambiguity in the tortious
2
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provisions apply to the SEL benefits available under section 56-
11-120.18 Plaintiff Tillotson, a pedestrian, was injured when he
was struck by an automobile. He incurred compensable PIP
losses of $4492.06.11 Because he was a pedestrian, he received
$1000 pursuant to the BEL provisions of the driver's policy.2 0 The
driver did not carry the SEL coverage, but Tillotson had elected
this coverage up to the amount of $5000 under his own automobile
policy. After receiving the maximum BEL benefits available
under the driver's policy, Tillotson filed a claim to recover
$3492.06 in SEL benefits from his own carrier, State Farm.2 ' State
Farm offered to pay the claim in full if Tillotson would agree to
execute a "Loan Receipt Under Personal Injury Protection Cover-
age. ' 22 The loan receipt would have required Tillotson to reim-
burse State Farm if he later recovered damages for personal inju-
ries from the driver or the driver's insurance carrier. Tillotson
refused to execute the loan receipt and commenced the action
against his insurer, claiming $3492.06 and alleging that the pol-
icy's subrogation clause was in contravention of the Act. Prior to
the trial, Tillotson and the driver's insurer settled for $14,000 over
the $1000 BEL benefits already paid under the driver's policy.?
The trial court held for the insured, awarding him the full amount
he sought. State Farm appealed the case to the supreme court.
Before its amendment in 1978, the BEL provision stated that
"[n]o benefit payable pursuant to this section shall be subject
drafting of the Act. . . ." Brief of Respondent at 9.
18. 268 S.C. at 251, 233 S.E.2d at 297.
19. The facts are stated in Brief of Appellant at 4-6. This statement of the case was
adopted by the Respondent. Brief of Respondent at 4.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-150(b) (1976).
21. Tilloson set off the $1000 he had recovered from the driver's policy, as required
by S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-150(a) (1976). The provisions of the Act relating to who
recovers from whom are complicated, to say the least. The Act defines "insured" to
include pedestrians, permissive users, and guests, along with the named insured and
members of his family. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (1976) (amended 1978). This provision,
standing alone, would seem to indicate that a person injured as a pedestrian, guest, or
permissive user, could choose between recovering from his own insurer or that of the driver
of the automobile. Section 56-11-150, however, sets up a definite scheme to govern these
situations. If the owner of the car involved is insured under a PIP policy, the injured party
must recover from the insurer of the vehicle. Id. § 56-11-150(b). If, on the other hand, the
owner of the vehicle has no PIP coverage, the injured person may recover from his own
insurer. Id. § 56-11-150(a). Although the Act is not explicit on this matter, a person who
has elected the SEL coverage may apparently recover the SEL benefits from his own
insurer if the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident has not bought this extra
coverage. This is what happened in Tillotson.
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to subrogation or assignment except as provided for in § 56-11-
130(b)." 4 Section 56-11-130(b), which was repealed in 1978, was
called the "offset provision," by members of the insurance indus-
try.2 It required that any subsequent recovery by the insured
from another party in the accident be reduced by the amount of
the BEL benefits paid to him.28 This set-off took place only if the
person's insurance policy contained at least the mandatory BEL
coverage.27 The SEL provision requires that the optional benefits
be "of the same kind and supplemental to" 28 those described in
the BEL provision. These provisions were at the center of the
arguments offered by the parties in Tiltotson.
Appellant made two contentions in support of its position
that the SEL benefits should be subject to subrogation. First, it
pointed out that the sentence in the BEL provision strictly limit-
ing subrogation and assignment applies only to benefits payable
pursuant to that section.29 Appellant contended that the SEL
benefits were not benefits payable pursuant to the BEL section
and that the insured and the insurer therefore should be allowed
to contract freely over subrogation of the SEL benefits. 0
Appellant's second argument was not as straightforward as
the first, and its weaknesses were caused in part by the impreci-
sion of the language of the Act. Appellant contended that for the
SEL benefits to be "of the same kind" as the BEL benefits, they
had to be subject to subrogation.' This argument was seriously
flawed. Although the Act seems to say that PIP benefits are to
be subject to subrogation at times, in reality no exception existed
to the no-subrogation rule found in the BEL section. The BEL
section provided that there would be no subrogation or assign-
ment except as provided in section 56-11-130(b)."2 This latter
section, however, had nothing to do with subrogation as that term
is commonly understood. Subrogation is generally defined as the
substitution of one person in the place of another with reference
to a lawful claim or right.3 Section 56-11-130(b) did not permit
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (1976) (amended 1978).
25. S.C. DEP'T OF INS., BULL. No. 6-78, at 2 (Aug. 16, 1978).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-130(b) (1976) (repealed 1978).
27. Id,
28. Id. § 56-11-120 (1976).
29. Brief of Appellant at 6.
30. Id. at 6-7.
31. Id. at 11-12.
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (1976) (amended 1978).
33. 73 AM. JUR. 2d, Subrogation § 1 (1974).
1979]
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an insurer which had satisfied a claim under an insured's PIP
protection to step into the shoes of its insured to pursue legal
rights against a tortfeasor. Instead, section 56-11-130(b) required
that any recovery of damages from a tortfeasor who was covered
under a PIP policy be reduced by the amount recovered by plain-
tiff under the BEL provisions of his or anyone else's policy. This
is not subrogation; it is more in the nature of a set-off.34 The
drafters of the Act purposely chose this form of remedy to make
certain that the burden of the BEL losses was not shifted from
the insurer of the injured party to the insurer of the tortfeasor.3
Because BEL benefits were not subrogable, appellant's argument
that SEL benefits had to be subject to subrogation to be "of the
same kind" as BEL benefits was without merit.
Respondent's contention, which the court ultimately ac-
cepted, was that the SEL benefits were subject to neither subro-
gation nor set-off.36 Respondent pointed out that the BEL bene-
fits were not subject to any true subrogation at all.37 To be of the
"same kind" as the BEL benfits, he argued, the SEL benefits also
had to be immune from subrogation .3 He emphasized that the
set-off provision applied by its own terms only to the required
BEL benefits and that, because the SEL benefits were purely
optional, they were not to be set off under section 56-11-130(b) .3
The court's opinion reflects the confusion that characterized
the arguments in the briefs of the parties. The court plainly held
that the SEL benefits were not to be subrogated. 0 The precise
ground for this holding, however, is difficult to ascertain. The
court stated that "[tihe only subrogation or assignment permit-
ted is that described in [section 56-11-130(b)], and this section
refers to '. . a claimant recovering from his insurer the benefits
required by [the BEL section] . . . .' It does not refer to supple-
mental benefits permitted by [the SEL section]."4 The court's
point is clear, but the court neglected to refute appellant's argu-
ment that the subrogation prohibition applied only to benefits
payable under the BEL section. 2 This is unfortunate, because it
34. See 20 AM. Jun. 2d, Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 2 (1965).
35. See Note, supra note 2, at 717-18.
36. Brief of Respondent at 5-9.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 8 (quoting Note, supra note 2).
40. 268 S.C. at 253, 233 S.E.2d at 298.
41. Id.
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makes the court's opinion incomplete. One way in which the
holding can be reconciled with the statutory language is if the
court found that the SEL benefits are payable pursuant to the
BEL section. This interpretation of the Act, however, would be
very contrived. A better rationale for the holding that the no-
subrogation clause applies to both SEL and BEL benefits appears
in respondent's brief.43 It is that for the SEL benefits to be of the
"same kind" as the BEL benefits, they must not be subject to
subrogation. The court did not discuss this interpretation, but it
might have been the underlying rationale for its decision.
Tillotson's status as a pedestrian might lead a reader unfa-
miliar with the intricacies of the Act to dismiss the holding of the
court as applicable only to cases in which PIP benefits are re-
ceived by the injured party from an insurer other than his own.
This reading of the case, however, would be unduly restrictive.
Although the facts in Tillotson were complicated by the plain-
tiff's recovery of BEL benefits from one insurer and of SEL bene-
fits from another, the court's holding would apply even if two
vehicles covered by separate PIP policies were involved in an
accident. If the insurer of the party not at fault conditioned its
payment of SEL benefits upon the agreement of its insured to
subrogate it to his rights against the tortfeasor, the insured would
have to rely upon Tillotson to show that these SEL benefits are
not subject to subrogation.
The posture of the law after Tillotson and before the 1978
amendments was clear: no subrogation of any SEL or BEL bene-
fits was to take place, and the set-off was to be limited to only
the $1000 BEL coverage. Any SEL benefits received by an insured
from his insurer were to be immune from set-off in a subsequent
tort recovery. The 1978 amendment changed this legal status quo
in one material respect. Section 56-11-130(b), the offset provision,
was repealed;" because of this deletion, no set-off will take place
of any benefits received under the wholly optional coverage now
provided for in the Act. 5
The South Carolina Automobile Reparation Reform Act, as
it existed prior to the 1978 amendments, was a "modified form
of no fault automobile insurance."" In a true no-fault system, PIP
benefits are substitutes for damages that might be recovered in a
43. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
44. No. 569, 1978 S.C. Acts 1668.
45. S.C. DEP'T OF INS., BULL. No. 6-78 at 2 (Aug. 16, 1978).
46. Note, supra note 2, at 706.
1979] INSURANCE
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lawsuit against another party in an accident, if that party was at
fault." In pure no-fault systems, an injured party may not bring
a suit against a tortfeasor unless he can show that damages in
excess of a statutorily set threshold amount were suffered. One
of the goals of a no-fault PIP system is decreasing the number of
automobile accident-related lawsuits."5 The South Carolina Act,
subsequent to the 1978 amendments, falls considerably short of
being a pure no-fault system. Because the benefits recovered from
an injured party's insurer under the wholly optional coverage
available under the Act can neither be set off nor subjected to
subrogation, the injured party is not discouraged from bringing a
lawsuit against a tortfeasor. By successfully bringing suit he can
recover double the amount of his compensable PIP losses. There-
fore, the South Carolina Automobile Reparation Reform Act does
not provide "no-fault coverage" at all.
11. LIABILITY INsURANcE AND THE INTENTIONAL
ACT EXCLUSION
In Miller v. Fidelity-Phoenix Insurance Co.4" the supreme
court upheld an insurer's liability under a homeowner's policy for
damages resulting from an intentional act of the insured. A ten-
year-old boy, an "insured" under his parents' policy, set fire to
his neighbor's home, causing extensive damage to that property.
The suit was based on the coverage of the parents' homeowner's
policy." The insurer, alleging that the damage was "intentional,"
contended that it was not liable because a provision in the policy
excluded coverage for property damage "caused intentionally by
or at the direction of the insured."'" The court was asked to deter-
mine whether this clause excluded coverage for the boy's act.
The court reasoned that for an act to be intentional, and
therefore excluded from coverage under the policy, "not only the
act causing the loss must have been intentional, but . . . the
results of the act must also have been intentional."52 That the
child had set the fire intentionally was not disputed;5 3 he had
47. Am. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, FEDERAL NO-FAULT INSURANCE
LEGISLATION 15 (1978).
48. See Nations, Statutory Damages Recovery: Personal Injury Protection Coverage,
18 S. Tax. L.J. 289, 290 (1977).
49. 268 S.C. 72, 231 S.E.2d 701 (1977).
50. Id. at 74, 231 S.E.2d at 702.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 74, 231 S.E.2d at 703.




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
broken into the house to set the fire. "4 The insurer could not show,
however, that the child intended the fire to "cause the type of loss
or injury which result[ed]."" The child intended a fire to result
from his act; his father testified that the child wanted to experi-
ence "the excitement of the fire trucks."56 The trial judge deter-
mined, and the supreme court agreed, however, that the child
"set the fire as a prank without any conscious intent to cause
major destruction and property damage. ' 57 The harm done, in
substantially exceeding that intended, could not be said to have
been caused "intentionally." The insurer, therefore, failed to
meet the test, and the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
finding that the insurer was liable under the parents' policy.
A forceful dissent was filed by Justices Littlejohn and Ness.
The dissenters contended that "[a] homeowner's policy serves to
protect against loss from the unexpected or unlikely. It is not
designed to protect against acts purposefully planned."58 These
two justices would have denied coverage.
The majority decision follows the lead of a number of juris-
dictions." These decisions initially appear to conflict with the
long-standing rule that prohibits individuals from insuring
against their own intentional torts. 0 This rule originated from the
belief that individuals would be more inclined to commit inten-
tional torts if they could be sure of insurance for the conse-
quences.61 The apparent conflict between Miller and this general
rule, however, can be reconciled. For certain classes of insured
persons, such as young children or the mentally handicapped, the
"propensity for intentional wrongdoing would not be measurably
affected by the availability of insurance."" For these classes of
insured persons, the public policy against allowing liability cover-
age for intentional wrongs is totally inapplicable.
In the wake of Miller, insurers of South Carolina residents
may wonder if the exclusionary clauses for intentional acts are
54. Id. at 76, 231 S.E.2d at 703.
55. Id. at 75, 231 S.E.2d at 702.
56. Id. at 78, 231 S.E.2d at 704.
57. Id. at 75, 231 S.E.2d at 702.
58. Id. at 76, 231 S.E.2d at 703.
59. See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F.Supp. 257 (D.Conn. 1965); Smith
v. Moran, 61 Ill. App.2d 157, 209 N.E.2d 18 (1965); Morrill v. Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578,
122 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
60. Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 1219 (1969).
61. Id. at 1245-46.
62. Id. at 1252.
1979] INSURANCE
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worth the space they occupy on the policy forms. The situation
is not, however, as bleak as it might appear to be. Insurers could
probably rewrite their provisions to further limit their liability for
intentional acts. A properly drafted clause could completely ne-
gate the effect of the Miller decision. If an exclusionary clause
expressly stated that the insurer would not be liable for any dam-
age, no matter how unforeseen, resulting from an act the perform-
ance of which was intended by the insured, the insurer would be
protected from liability, regardless of the insured's capacity.
While insurance policies are generally to be construed against the
insurer and in favor of the insured, 3 when a provision is unambi-
guous the courts may not twist its meaning to extend coverage
beyond that intended by the parties."
Sue C. Erwin
63. Miller v. Fidelity Phoenix Ins. Co., 268 S.C. 72, 231 S.E.2d 701 (1977); Whitting-
ton v. Ranger Ins. Co., 261 S.C. 582, 201 S.E.2d 620 (1973).
64. General Ins. Co. of America v. Palmetto Bank, 268 S.C. 355, 233 S.E.2d 699
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